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Abstract 
In recent years, the problem of sex trafficking has migrated to the forefront of prostitution policy 
discussions, shifting the focus away from arguments surrounding the morality of prostitution, 
and instead, to consideration of the most effective prostitution policy approach to combat sex 
trafficking. One popular solution focuses on reducing the demand for sex trafficking by reducing 
the overall demand for prostitution. In order to reduce demand for prostitution, people must be 
deterred from purchasing sexual services, in any form, which may be accomplished by 
criminalizing the purchase of prostitution. The present inquiry will compare the demand 
reduction approaches of Sweden and the United Kingdom, evaluating each approach in relation 
to deterrence theory, which comprises the fundamental basis for demand reduction principles. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research 
Introduction  
 Often referred to as the world‘s oldest profession, prostitution is the practice of engaging 
in sexual relations in exchange for payment of money or goods, and is one of the branches of the 
sex industry. A person who engages in this practice is known as a prostitute, a type of sex worker 
(Kovari & Pruyt, 2012). As the demand for prostitution continues to flourish across much of the 
globe, so does the desire to keep costs low and profits high for stakeholders in the sexual services 
industry (Hughes, 2004; Shively, Wheeler, & Hunt., 2012; United States Department of State, 
2011). Hence, the demand for a cheap, easily-subdued workforce sustains the market for sex 
trafficking, a form of human trafficking focused on the exploitation of people for work in the sex 
industry (Home Office, 2008; Kovari et al., 2012; UNODC, 2012).  
 In recent years, the problem of sex trafficking has migrated to the forefront of prostitution 
policy discussions, shifting the focus away from arguments surrounding the morality of 
prostitution, and instead, to consideration of the most effective prostitution policy approach to 
combat sex trafficking (Berger, 2012; Cho & Neumayer, 2013; Home Office, 2008; Liu, 2011; 
Miriam, 2005). One popular solution, known as demand reduction (often referred to as the 
―Nordic Model‖ or ―Swedish Model‖), asserts that in order to effectively reduce the demand for 
sex trafficking, the overall demand for prostitution must be reduced. In order to reduce demand 
for prostitution, people must be deterred from purchasing sexual services, in any form, which 
may be accomplished by criminalizing the purchase of prostitution (Bucken-Knapp, Karlsson 
Schaffer, & Persson Strömbäck, 2012; Berger, 2012; Cho, et.al., 2013). On February 28, 2014, in 
an effort to encourage member countries to adopt this model, the European Parliament passed a 
non-binding resolution in support of reducing the demand for prostitution by criminalizing the 
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purchase of prostitution, not its sale (European Parliament, 2014). The United Kingdom (UK) 
(specifically, England and Wales
1
) has a different approach to demand reduction policy, which 
focuses on deterring the purchase of sex from trafficked individuals specifically, rather than 
outlawing the purchase of sex altogether (Policing and Crime Act, 2009).  
            As sex trafficking is a global problem linked to the existence of prostitution, it is 
important to analyze varying approaches to prostitution and sex trafficking policy, in order to 
understand the relationship that exists (if any) between such policies and the subsequent demand 
for sex trafficking (Kovari et al., 2012; Liu, 2011). The European Parliament's recent 
recommendation asserts that the objective to end the demand for prostitution overall, as 
demonstrated by Sweden, is the most effective strategy. The present inquiry will compare the 
demand reduction approaches of Sweden and Great Britain, evaluating each approach in relation 
to deterrence theory, which comprises the fundamental basis for demand reduction principles.  
Background of the Problem - Prostitution and Sex Trafficking  
 Across the globe, the legal status of prostitution varies from country to country, but 
generally falls into one of three categories: illegal, legal and regulated, or decriminalized (not 
regulated, but also not subject to criminal penalties) (Baker, Dalla, DeFrain, & Williamson, 
2011). The 2011 Global Risk Report, issued by the World Economic Forum, estimated the global 
market size of prostitution to be $190 billion US Dollars (World Economic Forum, 2011).  With 
regard to female prostitutes (which comprise an unspecified majority of prostitutes across the 
globe), most feminist scholars agree that prostitution is the result of patriarchal hierarchy within 
society, yet, opinions vary regarding the level of self-determination present driving an 
individual‘s choice to become a prostitute (Carpenter, 1994; Lalor & McElvaney, 2010; 
                                                          
1
  As  England and Wales share a common legal system, for brevity, these two shall be referred to as ―the 
UK‖ throughout this work, however, it is necessary to note that as  Scotland and Northern Ireland operate as distinct 
legal jurisdictions, their policies are not associated with references to ―the UK‖  throughout this work (Swift, 2015). 
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Manzano, 2005; Matthews, 2008; Miriam, 2005; Munro, 2011; Segrave Milivojevic, & 
Pickering, 2009; Sullivan 2007). For example, proponents of prostitution‘s legalization assert 
that it is a legitimate line of work that is chosen by rational actors, and is not inherently 
irrespective of individual dignity (Gauthier, 2010; Van der Bruggen, 2013).  The counter-
viewpoint to this perspective views prostitution as an inherently dehumanizing and violent 
practice that cannot be rationally chosen, due to the presence of systemic coercion that is caused 
by unequal gender roles, disordered perceptions of self-worth, and economic disadvantage 
(Carpenter, 1994; Lalor, et al., 2010; Manzano, 2005; Matthews, 2008; Miriam, 2005; Munro, 
2011; Segrave et al., 2009; Sullivan 2007).   
 As previously indicated, as the global demand for prostitution continues to grow, so does 
the desire to maximize profits within sexual services industry (Hughes, 2004; Shively, Kliorys, 
Wheeler, & Hunt, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2011 (a)). As employers of sex workers 
pursue an economic advantage over their competitors, the demand for a cheap, easily subdued 
workforce sustains the demand for controlling labor in the sex trade, and is accomplished by sex 
trafficking. In contrast to varying opinions of prostitution, due to its inherent denial of self-
determination and exploitative nature, sex trafficking is generally recognized as a human rights 
violation and a crime of opportunity (Home Office, 2008; Kovari et al., 2012; UNODC, 2012). 
The United Nations has condemned the trade, and in Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons offers the following definition: 
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, 
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
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exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs (United Nations, 2000, p.1).            
 Due to varying law enforcement paradigms regarding prostitution, countries such as 
Amsterdam, which has legalized its sex trade, may have an entirely different experience 
dealing with sex trafficking than that of a country such as Saudi Arabia, where prostitution, or 
any form of public affection for that matter, is strictly forbidden (BBC News, 2007; BBC News 
Europe, 2011; Home Office, 2008; Liu, 2011). As this inquiry will discuss in further detail, 
traditional discourse surrounding the variance of prostitution policy has been historically 
polarized between proponents of legalizing prostitution (a system which considers prostitution 
to be a viable labor sector subject to regulation) and those who support outright abolition 
techniques (making all forms of prostitution illegal, and thus, subject to criminal penalties) 
(Day, 2009; Horowitz, 2005; Miriam, 2005; Post, 2011; Valor-Segura, Expósito, & Moya, 
2011). 
  Policy Considerations 
       When considering the role of a nation‘s approach to prostitution policy in relation to sex 
trafficking, those in favor of legalizing prostitution argue that such a system will offer more 
transparency to the sex industry. This stance asserts that measures such as regulatory record-
keeping, sex-worker registries, and mandatory health-checks, etc. will make the detection of 
sex trafficking operations easier. Further, proponents of legalization claim that victims of 
trafficking will be more likely to seek the help of the authorities in countries where fear of 
legal repercussion is not of concern (Berger, 2012; Datta & Post, 2013; Day, 2009; Horowitz, 
2005; Jaros, 2012; Miriam, 2005; Post, 2011; Valor-Segura, Expósito, & Moya, 2011). To the 
contrary, those in favor of abolishing prostitution assert that in regions where prostitution is 
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legal, sex trafficking may be ―lost in translation‖ among the widespread sex industry. As a 
result, such policy paradigms may entice traffickers, allowing them to mask their operations, 
thus making the apprehension of traffickers and discovery of trafficking operations more 
difficult for law enforcement (Farley, 2009; Hughes, 2004). 
           Sweden‘s 1999 introduction of the demand-reduction model offered a hybrid alternative 
to these traditional hard-lined prostitution policy approaches, by criminalizing the purchase of 
sexual services while decriminalizing their sale,  in order to deter individuals from purchasing 
sexual services (Berger, 2012; Cho et.al., 2013; Datta, & Post, 2013; Day, 2009; HM 
Government, 2011; Home Office, 2008; Jaros, 2012; Kara, 2011; Liu, 2011; Miriam, 2005; 
Post, 2011; Valor-Segura, Expósito, & Moya, 2011). Since its implementation in 1999, the 
Swedish Act on Prohibiting the Purchase of Sexual Services (SFS 1998:408) introduced legal 
sanctions for the purchase of sexual services, while decriminalizing their sale, in hopes that 
subsequent deterrence would result in a dramatic decrease in the demand for prostitution 
(Bucken-Knapp, et al., 2012; Marinova & James,  2012; Waltman, 2011).  According to the 
Swedish Penal Code (Chapter 6, Section 11), anyone caught engaging in the purchase of sexual 
services faces fines or imprisonment for a term of up to one year (Swedish Penal Code, 2013). 
The law‘s inception coincided with the introduction of a paradigm shift which considered that 
―gender inequality and sexual subordination could not be fought effectively by assuming a 
gender symmetry that empirically does not exist… a law against men purchasing women is 
called for… ending prostitution by ending the demand for it,‖ (MacKinnon, 2006, p. 186). 
             In 2010, the Swedish Ministry of Justice submitted a report titled "Prohibition of the 
Purchase of Sexual Services, an Evaluation 1999-2008" to the Swedish government. The 
purpose of the evaluation was to measure the effects of Sweden's prohibition of the purchase of 
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sexual services on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking for sexual purposes. 
According to the Swedish Ministry of Justice, the evaluation indicates that the prohibition of 
the purchase of sexual services has effectively reduced the demand for sexual services, and "is 
an important instrument in preventing and combating prostitution and human trafficking for 
sexual purposes," (Skarhed, 2010, p. 1). This overall reduction in the prevalence of street 
prostitution in Sweden, in conjunction with its low rates of prostitution overall, has garnered 
international interest and support for criminalizing the purchase of sexual services. In result, 
attention has been directed to consideration of the potential for achieving comparable reduction 
in the demand for trafficked sex workers (Ministry of Industry, 2005; Skarhed, 2010).  
 The UK has indicated alignment with Sweden's perspective insofar as recognizing that 
prostitution is an inherently degrading trade, which negatively affects the lives of individual 
prostitutes as well as greater society, and also agreeing that in order to combat sex trafficking, 
the demand for trafficked sex workers must be diminished  (Broadbridge, 2009; COI, 2006; 
Home Office, 2008). Despite this shared perspective between the two countries, their policy 
approaches to this end differ significantly, which is primarily attributable to the dissimilar legal 
status of prostitution in the two countries. In the UK, both the sale and purchase of sex are 
legal, and income derived from prostitution is taxable (Broadbridge, 2009). Certain forms of 
prostitution, such as brothel-keeping,
2
 street solicitation,
3
 and controlling the prostitution of 
others for monetary gain (pimping) are illegal (Policing and Crime Act, 2009; Sexual Offences 
Act 1956, [as amended] 2003).  To address demand reduction with relation to sex trafficking, 
the UK has outlawed paying for the sexual services of a prostitute who is ―subjected to force" 
                                                          
2 The Crown Prosecution Service defines a brothel as a premises within which more than one woman uses premises for 
the purposes of prostitution, either simultaneously or one at a time (Stevens v Christy [1987] Cr. App. R. 249, DC). 
3 The practice of loitering and soliciting by a common prostitute in a street or public place for the  
purpose of prostitution (Street Offences Act, 1959 (as amended by The Policing and Crime Act, 2009) 
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(Policing and Crime Act, 2009; Sexual Offences Act 1956, [as amended] 2003), classifying it 
as a strict liability offense (illegal regardless of the client's knowledge of the servicer's 
consent). 
Purpose and Significance of the Study  
  As discussed, Sweden‘s statutory approach to demand-reduction establishes a primary 
objective of reducing the demand for all forms of prostitution by outlawing the purchase of any 
and all sexual services. Sweden presumes that if the demand for all types of prostitution is 
diminished, the demand for trafficked sex workers will also diminish. In contrast, the UK's 
statutory approach to demand reduction establishes a primary objective of reducing the demand 
for forced prostitution, specifically by outlawing the purchase of sexual services from people 
subject to exploitation (pimping and sex trafficking). By making the act of purchasing sex from 
an exploited sex worker a strict liability offense, it is possible that ―would-be‖ sexual service 
clientele in the UK may be generally deterred, for fear of the risk of unknowingly engaging the 
services of a victim of sex trafficking, however, this potential secondary effect is not the 
primary focus of the UK policy. The Swedish statute ―guarantees‖ that one is breaking the law 
when attempting to purchase sexual services from any person, whereas the UK law categorizes 
a much smaller proportion of potential purchasers as criminals (those that purchase sexual 
services from exploited/trafficked sex workers), and thus garners only the potential for 
breaking the law (Bucken-Knapp, 2012; Marinova, & James, 2012; Policing and Crime Act, 
2009; Sexual Offences Act 1956, [as amended] 2003; Swedish Penal Code, 1999).   
 As Sweden and the UK have introduced policy approaches that seek to achieve demand 
reduction goals by deterring the purchase of respective sexual services, this inquiry seeks to 
determine how consistently the demand reduction policies of Sweden and the UK align with 
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the principles of deterrence theory. In order to make this determination, the researcher will 
conduct a qualitative, interpretive policy analysis of each nations' demand-focused prostitution 
laws, through the lens of deterrence theory, with a specific focus on celerity (swiftness) of 
punishment, certainty of punishment, and severity of punishment. This theoretical analysis of 
adherence to deterrence principles will contribute to a body of literature that seeks to inform 
policy approaches related to the demand for sex trafficking.  
Theoretical Conceptual Support for the Study 
 Formed during the Enlightenment period of the 18th Century and rooted in classical 
criminology, the origin of deterrence theory is credited to such philosophers as Jeremy 
Bentham and Cesare Beccaria. Since its inception, theorists have contributed to the 
development of deterrence theory, resulting in a paradigm that has laid the foundation for many 
modern law enforcement objectives (Kennedy, 1984; Morgan, 2012; Samaha, 2010). 
Deterrence theory proposes that the human population is generally comprised of rational actors 
who make calculated choices based on a cost-benefit analysis, in order to maximize pleasure 
and minimize pain (Morgan, 2012; Samaha, 2010). When applied to criminal behavior, 
deterrence theory claims that rational actors weigh the threat of punishment against the benefits 
of illegal activities when considering the commission of a crime. If the anticipated costs of 
committing crime outweigh its perceived benefits, rational actors will be deterred from 
engaging in criminal activity. Deterrence theory further suggests that deterrence from criminal 
acts may correspond to the perceived level of certainty, severity, and swiftness of the 
subsequent punishment (Becker, 1976; Morgan, 2012). Thus, in order to deter people from 
committing crime, it must be made less attractive by implementing severe, certain and swift 
penalties that increase the cost of illegal actions while minimizing their benefit (Keel, 2005; 
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Levinson, 2002; Nagin, 2012; Winfree, & Abadinsky, 2003; Wright, 2010).  
 Over time, the notion that sanctions will deter criminal acts has influenced policies, 
sentencing practices, and policing tactics throughout many societies (Karn, 2013; Onwudiwe, 
Odo & Onyeozili 2005; Kleiman, 2009; Ministry of Justice, 2003). Today, deterrence theory 
remains the primary foundation for Western criminal law and justice systems, including those 
of Sweden and the UK (Farrington, Langan & Wikstrom 1994; Karn, 2013; Ministry of Justice, 
2003).  
           The following literature review will discuss dynamics of sex trafficking and prostitution, 
and will introduce perspectives on the role of deterrence in modern law enforcement, with a 
focus on the discussion surrounding the roles of certainty, severity, and celerity in relation to 
criminal punishment.  Once introduced, the components of certainty, severity, and celerity will 
be utilized as the basis for the comparative analysis of the Swedish and UK demand reduction 
policies, in order to identify themes representative of deterrence theory. 
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
Human Trafficking - Overview 
            Human trafficking refers to the apprehension, transfer, and sale of people by improper 
means such as force, fraud or coercion, most commonly for the purposes sexual exploitation (58 
percent), and forced, non-sexual labor (36 percent) (UNODC, 2012).  Though the precise scope 
of human trafficking is unknown, estimates indicate that it enslaves people from 118 countries, 
and generates between $30 and $32 billion in revenue across the globe (UNODC, 2012; US 
Department of State, 2013).  Social scientists estimate that between 27 and 29.2 million people 
are enslaved at any given time across the globe, however, the figures regarding the proportion of 
slavery that is attributable to human trafficking vary, due to conflicting interpretations of 
associated definitions and figures (Kara, 2009; Smith, Martin and Smith, 2014).  
 Human trafficking often accompanies violent crime, weapons, and drug trafficking, and 
occurs within national borders as well as across international borders (UNODC, 2009; US 
Department of State, 2008).  Human trafficking spans many different cultures; however, its 
victims overwhelmingly originate from poor socioeconomic backgrounds (Broadbridge, 2009; 
Kara, 2011; Walk Free Foundation, 2013).  Trafficking operations are often devised within the 
frameworks of organized crime and depend upon the existence of a supply of vulnerable victims 
and a subsequent demand for forced labor, prostitution or human organs (European Parliament, 
2011; Hughes, 2004; Kara, 2011; Shively et al., 2012; UNODC, 2012; US Department of State, 
2013). Victims seeking better opportunities abroad (in countries that are perceived to have more 
lucrative employment scenarios) are implicated by abduction, deception, sale by family, or 
recruitment through false pretenses (Koettl, 2009; Kara, 2011; United Nations, 2000; UNODC, 
2012; US Department of State, 2013).   
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  The  United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
General Assembly Resolution 55/25 on November 15, 2000, is a primary international 
instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime and is further supplemented by the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, also ratified in 2000 (UNODC, 
2011).  In order to ascertain whether a particular circumstance constitutes trafficking in persons, 
it is necessary to consider the definition of trafficking in the Protocol in addition to the 
constituent elements of the offense, as defined by international law and by relevant domestic 
legislation (United Nations, 2000). These components are defined in the following manner:  
            The act: Considers the actions of the perpetrators and their roles as part of a trafficking 
operation, such as: recruitment, transportation, victim transfer, imprisonment of victims, and 
facilitation of exploitative venture (i.e. forced prostitution/labor). 
          The means: Considers the method through which the victim is apprehended: use of 
force/coercion, fraud/deception, abuse of power, or giving payments or benefits to a person in 
control of the victim.  
          The purpose: The reason for victim apprehension, including but is not limited to: sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or organ harvesting. These components, coupled with the 
aforementioned victim characteristics meet the requirements for the International Labor 
Organization‘s (ILO) definition of exploitation, which stipulates that an element of vulnerability 
must be present on behalf of the exploited individuals (ILO, 2005). 
 Fraudulent means of procuring victims involve false guarantees of legitimate 
employment, wages, working conditions, or other matters. Common examples of this practice 
include advertisements for modeling, nanny, or service industry job offers across borders. Once 
prospective employees accept a position, they are then eventually apprehended upon arrival in 
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foreign territory, often without their passports in possession, as they had been collected by the 
organizers under the guise of seemingly routine administrative procedures (paperwork, 
background checks, etc.) (TVPA, 2000; United Nations General Assembly, 2000; 2003; U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, 2012; The European Parliament and The Council of 
The European Union, 2011). 
 Force may be used as a method by traffickers to acquire victims, but throughout the 
literature, the exertion of force or violence is most often described as tactic intended to reinforce 
captivity and compliance once the victim has already been apprehended through fraudulent 
methods. Such tactics may involve the use of physical restraint or physical violence, including 
methods such as rape, beatings, and physical confinement, with the goal of exerting total control 
over victims. These efforts also seek to accomplish psychological manipulation of the victims, 
with the goal of encouraging complacency and cooperation by diminishing resistance and any 
hope of escape (Clawson et al., 2007; Deshpande & Nour, 2013; European Commission, 2012; 
European Commission, 2013; Hopper & Hidalgo, 2006; TVPA, 2000; United Nations General 
Assembly, 2000; 2003; U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2012; Zimmerman, 
Hossain, Yun, Roche, Morison, & Watts, 2006). 
 Coercion involves patterns of threatening behavior or language that lead a victim to 
believe that failure to comply with the wishes of the captor would result in physical violence, 
various forms of punishment, or legal ramifications (TVPA, 2000; United Nations General 
Assembly, 2000; 2003; U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2012; The European 
Parliament and The Council of The European Union, 2011). 
 In addition to the use of force and coercion to silence victims, trafficking operations 
evade detection by disguising their activities behind the guise of legitimate businesses, or, by 
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simply isolating their trafficking activities behind lock and key. These factors, in addition to its 
international reach across increasingly permeable borders (which is often enabled by 
unsatisfactory or corrupt border practices) make the successful detection of trafficking operations 
extremely challenging (Kara, 2010; Malarek, 2009; Malarek, 2011;  kubo  Shelley, 2011; 
Stoecker & Shelley, 2005; Tremblay & Karbassi, 2011; UNODC 2011, U.S. Department of 
State, 2013, Zhang, 2008). Of the estimated 27-29 million people that are enslaved due to 
trafficking at any given time around globe, only 44,000 were identified as victims during 2012 
(US Department of State, 2013).  
Sex Trafficking - Overview 
 Many international governments have begun to recognize the global crisis that has 
become the media frenzy often  referred to as ‗sexual slavery‘ (coerced or forced prostitution for 
the financial gain of a third party) (Hellie, 2006; Oosterveld, 2005).  Human trafficking for the 
purpose of commercial sexual exploitation is a referred to as sex trafficking, and is the most 
prevalent and profitable form of human trafficking, with women and children accounting for 98 
percent of victims (European Commission, 2013; Kanani, 2012; UNODC, 2009). Although legal 
definitions of commercial sexual exploitation vary from country to country, it may generally be 
defined as the provision of sexual services solely for the financial gain of a controlling third 
party (forced prostitution) (Boot, 2002, International Criminal Court, 2005; McDougall, 1998; 
TVPA, 2000). Sex traffickers often inform victims that they must work to repay the debts 
incurred from transporting the victims and to account for their living expenses (an illegal practice 
known as debt-bondage) (Hopper & Hidalgo, 2006; Kara, 2010; U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2012).   
 A variety of methods are incorporated as conditioning methods in order to exert 
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dominance and control over sex trafficking victims, which may include "starvation, confinement, 
beatings, physical abuse, rape, gang rape, threats of violence to the victims and the victims‘ 
families, forced drug use and the threat of shaming their victims by revealing their activities to 
their family and their families‘ friends," (Herman-Lewis, 1992; Hopper & Hidalgo, 2006; Kara, 
2010; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012,  p.1). The withholding of basic 
necessities, subjugation to various forms of torture and/or physical impairment, and overall 
isolation that victims are often confined to are all tactics employed by traffickers, as "in addition 
to inducing terror, the perpetrator seeks to destroy the victim's sense of autonomy. This is 
achieved by scrutiny and control of the victim‘s body and bodily functions," (Herman-Lewis, 
1992, p. 77; Hopper & Hidalgo, 2006). Sex traffickers eliminate any semblance of boundaries or 
self-determination held by their victims, in order to instill a sense of helplessness and complete 
reliance on the traffickers (Korzinski, 2011). Psychological risks to victims may include 
depression, panic disorder, anxiety, hypervigilance, suicide/suicidal ideation and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Clawson, Dutch, Solomon, & Grace, 2007; Deshpande & Nour, 2013; 
Hopper & Hidalgo, 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2006). Victims may experience traumatic bonding 
– a defense mechanism which involves the victims' identification with the perpetrator 
(commonly referred to as "Stockholm syndrome," in which victims mistake a lack of abuse or 
torture from their captors as an act of kindness), (Fabrique, Romano, Vecchi, & Van Hasselt, 
2007; Hopper & Hidalgo, 2006). Sex trafficking victims face numerous health risks, which 
include: drug and/or alcohol addiction,  physical injuries resulting from traumatic beatings and 
aggressive sexual encounters, diseases (sexually transmitted or otherwise), miscarriages, 
gynecologic problems, and forced or coerced abortions (Clawson et al., 2007; Deshpande & 
Nour, 2013; Hopper & Hidalgo, 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2006). 
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 Source and Destination Countries  
 Victims of trafficking generally originate from circumstances of economic, 
environmental, or personal hardship (known as "push factors"), while seeking to improve their 
standard of living and access to financial resources (known as "pull factors") (Europol, 2011, p. 
4).  As described by Hughes (2005): 
 The transnational sex trafficking of women and children is based on a balance between 
 the supply of victims from sending countries and the demand for victims in receiving 
 countries…Where prostitution is flourishing, pimps cannot recruit enough local women 
 to fill up the brothels, so they have to bring in victims from other places. (p. 5) 
 In 2013, the European Commission published "Trafficking in Human Beings," a 
statistical assessment of human trafficking characteristics among EU member states. The data 
provided for the study were sourced across a three-year period (2008-2010) from law 
enforcement agencies, NGOs, immigration data, border patrol data, social service agencies, and 
international organizations, and pertained to figures representing both confirmed and presumed 
victims (European Commission 2013).  Sixty-six percent of reported trafficking instances in 
2010 were for forms of sexual exploitation, followed by labor exploitation comprising 23 
percent, and "other" exploitation comprising 11 percent (European Commission, 2013). 
According to the study, countries with the highest amount of human trafficking victims 
(destination countries, with corresponding victim totals) for the year 2010 are as follows: Italy 
(2,381), Spain (1,605), Romania (1,154), the Netherlands (993), and France (726).  The United 
Kingdom reported a total of 427 trafficking victims in 2010, while Sweden reported a total of 74 
(for the same) (European Commission, 2013). The study further indicated that in 2010, the most 
prevalent countries of citizenship (source countries) for victims of human trafficking holding EU 
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citizenship were reported as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, and Lithuania, and the most 
prevalent source countries for victims of human trafficking not holding EU citizenship were 
reported as Nigeria, China, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Columbia (European 
Commission, 2013).    
 The Demand for Sex Trafficking 
 Variables such as cultural norms and corruption are difficult to quantify, and therefore 
skew attempts to model the shadow economies that drive large-scale international criminal 
organizations (Cho et al., 2013;  kubo  Shelley, 2011; Stoecker & Shelley, 2005). Yet, as 
economic models may not fully explain the economics of sex trafficking in their entirety, in 
order to understand demand reduction strategies, it is necessary to establish a baseline 
understanding of the economic principles attributed to demand reduction policies (Kara, 2009; 
Schlefer, J., 2012). As economic gain is the driving force behind the existence of prostitution and 
sex trafficking, demand-reduction asserts that in order to effectively reduce rates of prostitution 
and/or sex trafficking, demand for the associated services must be reduced (Berger, 2012; 
Bucken-Knapp, et al., 2012; Cho et.al., 2013; Home Office, 2008; Karlsson-Schaffer & Persson 
Strömbäck, 2012; Liu, 2011; Marinova & James, 2012; Miriam, 2005; Waltman, 2011).   
 In many industries, including sexual service, the price of labor constitutes a significant 
portion of the cost of doing business. All factors being equal, the cost of labor is in direct 
opposition to an employer‘s profitability. When considering legal/legitimate employment, wages, 
benefits, insurance, and assumed liabilities regarding the health and safety of workers all 
negatively affect profits.  Employers may seek trafficked individuals as a cheaper labor source, 
maximizing the return on their ―investments‖ (the purchase of trafficked sex workers) by 
providing a minimum level of wellbeing for trafficked workers (Hughes, 2005; Kovari et al., 
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2012; Wheaton, Schauer, & Galli, 2010). Since victims of trafficking receive little compensation, 
if any, the savings on labor costs are thus reflected by competitive rates and higher profit 
margins, all the while providing seemingly comparable services to those of self-employed, 
consensual prostitutes. In 2007, Siddarth Kara conducted research to determine the profitability 
of sex trafficking by evaluating profits related to the sale of sex trafficking victims to proprietors 
of prostitution operations, utilizing data from the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
Utilizing conservative estimates of the ILO data for his calculations, Kara determined that the 
average annual profit per owned sex slave ranged from $11,349 in Africa to $78,196 in Western 
Europe, with a global weighted average of $29,210 (Kara, 2009).   
 Not only do owners of trafficked slaves get to keep all profits from the sexual services 
provided by their victims, they are able to offer lower rates than their competitors in order to 
increase patronage, without any regard for their workers‘ schedules, personal boundaries, 
preferences, or limitations (Hughes, 2005; Kovari et al., 2012; Wheaton et al., 2010).  This form 
of economic competition is known as direct competition (also called category competition or 
brand competition), a term used to describe products which perform the same function in 
competition with one another (Eatwell, Milgate, Newman, & Palgrave, 1987).  The Law of 
Demand states that when the price of a good falls, and everything else remains the same, demand 
for that good will increase (Carden, 2012; Mankiw &Taylor, 2011).  When applying such 
economic concepts to the commercial sex industry, the fundamental demand component is 
demand for commercial sex acts; with sexual services considered as goods (all attributes of the 
services provided being equal), the Law of Demand would thus infer that prostitutes who charge 
lower rates would generate higher demand than for those charging more for the same services 
(Kara, 2009; Kovari et al., 2012; Wheaton et. al., 2010). The roles of supply, demand, and 
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competition manifest a market for a cheaper labor supply in order to adequately fulfill the 
demand for sexual services while offering a competitively priced service, in order to maximize 
profitability (Kara, 2009).  
 In addition to these microeconomic relationships, macroeconomic trends also play a role 
in demand for human trafficking. Regions such as Southeast Asia and certain areas of Central 
and South America boast multi-billion dollar sex-tourism industries, which are made possible 
due to low-cost and widespread provision of commercial sexual services (Roby & Tanner, 2009; 
Somswasdi, 2004; Willis & Levy, 2002). In 2009, the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) reported that the demand for trafficking victims grew as a result of the 
recession, due to the increase in demand for cheaper goods and services (UNODC, 2009).  
 A study published in 2013, by Cho et al., investigates the impact of legalized prostitution  
on sex trafficking by examining the "effect of legalizing prostitution on the demand, supply, and 
thus, equilibrium quantity of prostitution," (p.3). The study proposes that, the legalization of 
prostitution presents two divergent outcomes in relation to demand for sex trafficking. The first 
outcome, referred to as a "substitution effect," anticipates that as more consensual prostitutes 
enter the market, due to decreased legal risks, the demand for sex workers will be more 
sufficiently met, thus reducing the demand for sex trafficking (Cho et al., 2013). The second 
outcome, referred to as the "scale effect," anticipates an overall increase in supply and demand 
for prostitution, following legalization, as new clients who were previously deterred from 
availing services from prostitutes, for legal reasons, will no longer be concerned as legal risks are 
mitigated (Cho et al., 2013).  Cho seeks to investigate the effects of the proposed increased scale 
outcome, in order to measure the effects of the aforementioned substitution outcome, by 
assessing the likely composition of prostitutes (consensual vs. trafficked): 
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If the scale of prostitution becomes larger once it is rendered legal, will the incidence of 
human trafficking also increase? The increased equilibrium quantity of prostitution will, 
for a constant share of trafficked prostitutes among all prostitutes, exert an increasing 
scale effect on the incidence of international trafficking for prostitution purposes...The 
full answer to the question depends on what happens to the composition of prostitutes and 
whether any substitution effect away from trafficked prostitutes (toward domestic 
prostitutes or foreign prostitutes legally residing and working in the country) is stronger 
than the scale effect the  associated "scale" and "substitution' outcomes of the former. (p. 
3) 
Cho's study conducted an estimated regression analysis on various countries' estimated human 
trafficking inflows (dependent variable) in consideration of the legal status of prostitution in each 
country (independent variable). To supplement the empirical data, the study also examined rates 
of sex trafficking in three countries that had recently changed their prostitution laws: Denmark, 
Sweden, and Germany. Conclusions indicate that the aforementioned "scale effect" overpowers 
the "substitution" effect of legalizing prostitution, resulting in an increased rate of sex trafficking 
in countries with legalized prostitution (Cho et al., 2013).  
Prostitution, Sex Trafficking, and Associated Policy Approaches 
 There are converging theories regarding how the legalization of prostitution and various 
dynamics of the sex trade affect human trafficking enforcement and human trafficking crime 
rates (Clemmitt, 2008).  It is important for researchers and policymakers to evaluate which 
policy approaches are most effective for addressing the issue of human trafficking in legalization 
zones and countries.  Further, it is important to distinguish between legalization of prostitution 
and decriminalization of prostitution, terms that are important to the focus of the current 
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research.  Decriminalization of prostitution removes the sale of sex from the realm of law 
enforcement by repealing criminal laws pertaining to prostitution (Barnett, Casavant & Hindle 
2008).  Legalization of prostitution establishes rules under which sex work may proceed, such as 
size and location of brothels and requirements for disease testing.  Under legalized systems, 
prostitutes operating outside the regulated industry face prosecution (Clemmitt, 2008). 
Prohibitionist approaches deem any form of prostitution to be illegal, holding all involved parties 
liable for criminal penalties, and do not recognize prostitution as a form of labor (Outshoorn, 
2004; Outshoorn, 2005).  
 The literature is consistent in its construction and inclusion of prostitution, sex 
trafficking, brothel keeping and generally any form of commercially-driven sexual activity as 
components of the sex industry (Broadbridge, 2009; Ditmore, 2011; Home Office, 2007; Home 
Office, 2008; Hughes, 2005). Sociological and criminological professionals agree that sex 
trafficking involves forced sexual labor and bondage (Clemmitt, 2008; Feinberg, 2003; Hodge & 
Lietz, 2007).  Prostitution, on the other hand, is widely considered to be a more consensual and 
profitable venture (Clemmitt, 2008, Feinberg 2003).  Still, views reflective of radical feminism 
argue that any form of sexual labor is sexual exploitation, regardless of the legal status of 
prostitution, as the level of desperation necessary for one to make such a ―calculation‖ to exploit 
their own sexuality undermines the level of rationale that a person is allotted (Doezema, 2002; 
Shrage, 2008; Tong, 1989).  Such a position, often referred to as the abolitionist stance, asserts 
that such exploitation should be abolished, (Doezema, 2002; Shrage, 2008; Tong, 1989).    
 In contrast to the commercial and industrial similarities that exist among many developed 
countries, the subject of prostitution is a strong candidate for an exemplar of differences in social 
policy (U.S Department of State, 2010). For instance, prostitution is legal and regulated in The 
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Netherlands, Austria, and Germany, among other countries, with the intention that regulations 
and law enforcement will provide protections and creation of industry standards (Clemmitt, 
2008).  Prostitution is not regulated, with ranging levels of decriminalization in Spain, Slovenia, 
Portugal, Poland, and Malta. Prostitution is illegal in the US (save for certain localities within the 
state of Nevada) and certain European countries such as Moldova and Norway (U.S. Department 
of State, 2010).  In Sweden and Norway it is illegal to purchase the services of a prostitute, while 
the act of selling sex is decriminalized (often referred to as "The Nordic Model"), (Bucken-
Knapp, et al., 2012; Swedish Penal Code, 2013).  
 Article 9.5 of the United Nations‘ ‗Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children‘ (2000) requires States to ―discourage the demand 
that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children that leads to 
trafficking‖ (United Nations, 2000, p.5). Further, The Council of Europe Convention on Action 
Against Trafficking in Human Beings requires States to identify and suppress contributing 
factors to sex trafficking, with a focus on ending the demand for sexual exploitation of women 
(Council of Europe, 2005). The expansion of the European Union (EU) and recognition of the 
resultant growth and spread of sex trafficking throughout its borders have spurred awareness 
among relevant law enforcement agencies (European Commission, 2012; European Commission, 
2013; European Parliament, 2014).  Concern regarding further expansion of the EU to include 
economically strained nations, (of primary concern, eastern European/Balkan nations) has been 
raised, suggesting that increasing border mobility for traffickers between source and destination 
countries would only further exacerbate the problem (Cherkeh, Stribu, Lazaroiu, & Radu, 2004; 
European Commission, 2012; European Commission, 2013). 
 As the world advances toward a globalized political network of common interests and the 
29 
 
European Union continues to expand in membership, international and national policies 
addressing prostitution have global implications, especially in relation to how such policies 
affect human rights abuses, particularly sex trafficking (European Commission, 2012; European 
Commission, 2013).  The following section introduces examples of varying prostitution policies, 
with primary emphasis on those attributable to Sweden and the United Kingdom.       
 The United States - An Abolitionist Approach 
 Often presented through the lens of religious morality, the abolitionist approach to 
prostitution seeks to put an end to prostitution by outlawing it (Schulze et al., 2014; Hughes, 
2004; Mossman, 2007).  Contemporary abolitionist positions present prostitution as a degrading 
practice, with inherent gender and human rights implications, that is closely linked to sex 
trafficking (European Parliament, 2014; Hughes, 2004; Mossman, 2007). All forms of 
prostitution are illegal throughout the United States with the exception of some counties within 
the state of Nevada, which allow brothels. As determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Hoke v. United States, under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
the regulation of prostitution in the United States is not among the enumerated powers of the 
federal government, thus granting its domain to individual states (Heiges, 2009; Hoke v. United 
States, 227 U.S. 308, 1913).  One exception to state domain regarding prostitution regulation, as 
upheld by Hoke v. United States, is Congressional authority to regulate prostitution that involves 
interstate commerce, which was introduced through the Mann Act of 1910 (18 U.S.C.A. § 2421; 
Heiges, 2009). The Mann Act was the first federal law relating to prostitution in the U.S., and in 
its original form was introduced to outlaw the transport of women across state borders for 
prostitution, sex trafficking or ―any other immoral purpose," (Conant, 1996; Ditmore, 2011, 
Mann Act, 1910, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421). The ambiguity of the latter stipulation has been argued to 
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serve as a gateway for abuse of enforcement and criminalization of consensual sexual behavior 
(Conant, 1996; Ditmore, 2011; Weiner, 2008).  To remedy this allegation, the act was amended 
in 1986 to replace the phrase "any other immoral purpose" with "any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense‖ (Weiner, 2008, p. 1), therefore excluding the 
possibility of misguided enforcement for legal, consensual sexual involvement (Conant, 1995; 
Ditmore, 2011).  
 In 2000, the United States Congress passed The Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act (TVPA), a comprehensive federal law that specifically addresses the prosecution 
and punishment of traffickers, and provides certain protections for victims of trafficking (TVPA, 
2000; Siskin & Wyler, 2013). As policies specific to sex trafficking have developed significantly 
since the introduction of the Mann Act,  the U.S. Department of State maintains the position that 
prostitution is a contributing factor to the demand for sex trafficking: "Commercial sexual 
exploitation exists within the commercial sex trade, including prostitution. Prostitution is a 
contributing factor to trafficking in persons. People who buy sex acts, usually men, fuel the 
demand for sex trafficking," (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2008, p.3). 
 The Netherlands - Legal and Regulated Prostitution  
 While the European Parliament and the United Nations assert that sex trafficking is a 
human rights violation that must be addressed (Home Office, 2008; United Nations, 2000), 
several member states of the EU, including The Netherlands, have legalized prostitution (U.S. 
Department of State, 2010).  In the year 2000, The Netherlands lifted its general ban on brothels, 
to position prostitution as a recognized, regulated, and taxed line of work (Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012; Feinberg, 2003; Outshoorn, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2010). The 
Netherlands' decision to legalize brothels was introduced with the expectation that it would 
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increase transparency levels within the sex trade, and subsequently allow for more effective 
enforcement, by empowering possible trafficking victims to contact authorities (Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2012). This approach was founded in the belief that by criminalizing 
prostitution, the sex trade is driven underground, resulting in a loss of transparency and 
discouraging trafficking victims from approaching law enforcement, for fear of prosecution and 
subsequent punishment (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012; Feinberg, 2003; U.S. 
Department of State, 2010).  In 2012, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed this stance, 
stating: 
  The lifting of the ban on brothels makes prostitution a legitimate occupation and gives 
 sex workers the same rights and protection as other professionals. The labour laws offer 
 the most effective protection against exploitation, violence and coercion. Similarly, 
 Dutch policy on sexual violence is based on the conviction that strengthening the position 
 of women is the best way to prevent sexual violence. Moreover, abuses are easier to 
 detect when sex workers operate publicly and legally rather than in a clandestine
 subculture. (p.14) 
 Further, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that a "municipal licensing 
system enables the police and other law enforcement agencies to conduct inspections of brothels, 
subject to the mayor‘s consent,‖ (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p.14).  However, in 
2007, six years after lifting the general ban on brothels, city leaders decided to close one-third of 
its brothels in the famous red-light district of Amsterdam.  As discussed by Cullen-Deupont, 
2009, Mayor Job Cohen stated that the ―trade involved exploitation and trafficking of women 
and other kinds of criminal activity‖ and due to expansive scale of the sex trade in Amsterdam, 
combined with insufficient means for necessary policy enforcement, the legalization of 
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prostitution ―didn‘t bring us what we hoped and expected…we want in part to reverse it, 
especially with regard to the exploitation of women in the sex industry‖ (p. 197). Cohen further 
explained that the decision to spend twenty-five million Euro to convert the red light district into 
a commercial district was ordered in hopes that regulation of the sex trade within Amsterdam 
will be more effective as a result of a smaller geographic enforcement center (BBC New, 2007; 
Cullen-DuPont, 2009).  The literature suggests that an outcome such as that which occurred in 
Amsterdam indicates that the juxtaposition of the voluntary and involuntary trades may cause 
enforcement difficulties for both legal and illegal forms of prostitution (Feinberg, 2003; 
Outshoorn, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2011).  
 The UK - Selective Decriminalization of Prostitution 
 In the UK, policies addressing prostitution in relation to sex trafficking are primarily 
governed by the Sexual Offences Act, which was instituted in 1956 and has been amended 
multiple times, most recently in 2003, via the Policing and Crime Act, 2009 (Policing and Crime 
Act, 2009; Sexual Offences Act, 2003 (as amended)).  In the UK, the act of selling sex is legal, 
however, if the method in which such an act gives rise to public nuisance (street prostitution), 
involves minors, pimping, or exploitation, the act is then rendered unlawful (Policing and Crime 
Act, 2009; Sexual Offences Act, 2003). The Sexual Offences Act, and its subsequent 
amendments regarding public order and sexual offenses, govern associated guidelines for 
permissible and non-permissible prostitution activities, expressly prohibits involvement in sex 
trafficking and related activity, public solicitation of prostitution, controlling prostitution of 
others for economic gain (pimping) and any form of prostitution involving populations not 
capable of rendering consent (the mentally ill and children) (Policing and Crime Act, 2009; 
Sexual Offences Act, 2003).  
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 Despite the legal status of selling sex, the Crown Prosecution Service considers 
prostitution as a form of sexual exploitation and violence against women, due to its gendered 
nature (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014).  Citing mandates issued by the United Nations and 
The Council of Europe requiring that member states take action to diminish the demand for sex 
trafficking, the Parliament of the United Kingdom introduced The Policing and Crime Act 
(2009), which was "developed in part, to enable the UK to meet its international legal obligations 
to discourage the demand for sexual services," (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014, p.13). Section 
14 of the Policing and Crime Act (2009) amended the Sexual Offences Act, by creating a new 
offense for paying for the sexual services of a prostitute who is, or has been, subject to force. The 
new offense is a strict liability offense, which means that ignorance of such force does not offer a 
defense, and subsequent clients could face prosecutions for failure to make proper inquiry; the 
offense carries a maximum penalty of 1,000 GBP (British Pound Sterling) (Criminal Justice Act, 
1982; Policing and Crime Act, 2009; Sexual Offences Act, 2003).  The offense was established 
under 53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as amended by section 14 of the Policing and 
Crime Act 2009): 
 The new section creates a strict liability offence which is committed if someone pays or  
 promises payment for the sexual services of a prostitute who has been subject to  
 exploitative conduct of a kind likely to induce or encourage the provision of sexual  
 services for which the payer has made or promised payment. The person responsible  
 for the exploitative conduct must have been acting for or in the expectation of gain for  
 himself or herself or another person, other than the payer or the prostitute. 
 Subsection (2) of the new section provides that it does not matter where in the world  
 the sexual services are to be provided. An offence is committed regardless of whether  
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 the person paying or promising payment for sexual services knows or ought to know or  
 be aware that the prostitute has been subject to exploitative conduct. In other words  
 the offence is one of strict liability and no mental element is required in respect of the  
 offender‘s knowledge that the prostitute was forced, threatened, coerced or deceived
 (Lipscombe & Beard, 2014, p. 7). 
 In 2014, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution and the Global Sex Trade 
conducted an assessment titled "Shifting the Burden," which examined the current landscape of 
prostitution laws in the UK. The assessment concluded that "because our lawmakers send no 
clear signals about the nature of prostitution, the most visible – women who sell sex – are 
targeted, while men who create the demand often walk away, without taking responsibility for 
the damage they do" (All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution and the Global Sex Trade, 
2014, p. 4). Further, the report indicates that current UK legislation is "complicated and 
confusing," and that due to certain loopholes, johns often escape prosecution for offenses such 
engaging sexual services from girls as young as 13, and from victims of sex trafficking (All-
Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution and the Global Sex Trade, 2014, p. 4). With regard to 
law enforcement, the report concludes that policing and enforcement of prostitution and 
associated laws is inconsistently prioritized throughout the country, the only exceptions being the 
result of  "extraordinary political leadership at a local level" (All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Prostitution and the Global Sex Trade, 2014, p. 4).  In line with the aforementioned 2014 
European Commission recommendation, and with the established Swedish model, the "Shifting 
the Burden" report recommends that the UK introduce a general offense for the purchase of 
sexual services, while removing criminal culpability for prostitution-related offenses from those 
selling sexual services (All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution and the Global Sex Trade, 
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2014). 
Sweden - Demand Reduction 
 Swedish prostitution policy is founded in the belief that prostitution is a form of gendered 
exploitation and violence against women, that is harmful not only to prostitutes, but also to 
society overall (Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications, 2004). As 
Gunilla Ekberg explains: 
 Eliminating demand as the root cause of prostitution is a cornerstone of Swedish 
 policies. If  men did not consider that  they had the right to buy and sexually exploit 
 women and  children, prostitution and trafficking in human beings for sexual purposes 
 would not occur...Prostitution and trafficking in human beings for sexual purposes are  
 seen as issues that cannot, and should not be separated; both are harmful practices and 
 intrinsically linked...The legalization of prostitution will inevitably normalize an extreme 
 form of sexual discrimination and violence and  strengthen male domination of all female 
 human beings (Ekberg, 2013, p.1). 
 As such, Sweden was the first country in the world to criminalize the purchase of sexual 
services, instead of criminalizing its sale. As a result of the Act Prohibiting the Purchase of 
Sexual Services (SFS 1998:408), since January 1, 1999, purchasing (or attempting to purchase) 
sexual services constitutes a criminal offense punishable by fines or up to six months 
imprisonment. "The offence comprises all forms of sexual services, whether they are purchased 
on the street, in brothels, in so-called massage parlours, from escort services or in other similar 
circumstances, (Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications, 2005, p.1). On April 1, 
2005, the Act Prohibiting the Purchase of Sexual Services was amended to include cases where 
the payment has been promised or arranged by an intermediary, such as an escort service, and the 
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new version of the law was instituted under Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish Penal Code 
(Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2015). On July 1, 2011, the maximum penalty for 
purchasing (or attempting to purchase) sexual services was raised from imprisonment for six 
months to imprisonment for one year (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2015).  
 To address the exploitation of prostitutes by third parties, Chapter 6, Section 12 of the 
Swedish Penal Code, indicates that the financial exploitation (or its attempt) of  "a person‘s 
engagement in casual sexual relations in return for payment (p.1)" shall constitute the offense of 
procuring, which is punishable by imprisonment up to four years. Further, to inhibit the 
availability of venues for the sale of sexual services, this section extends the offense of procuring 
to include allowing one's property to knowingly be utilized "for purposes of that the premises are 
wholly or to a substantial extent used for casual sexual relations in return for payment...he or she 
shall, if the activity continues or is resumed at the premises, be considered to have promoted the 
activity and shall be held criminally responsible" (Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 6, Section 12, 
2014, p.1).  
 Since the enaction of the laws, national surveys suggest that the number of men who 
reported having purchased sex dropped from 12.7 percent in 1996 to 7.6 percent in 2008 
(Kuosmanen, 2011).  In 2008, the Swedish Ministry of Justice appointed a special committee 
charged with evaluating the ban against the purchase of sexual services, in order to detail its 
practical application and the effects of criminalization on the occurrence of prostitution and sex 
trafficking.  The committee found that since the introduction of the Act Prohibiting the Purchase 
of Sexual Services the rate of street prostitution had reduced by more than half (from 650 to 300) 
(Holmstrom & Skilbrei, 2008; SOU, 2010). Further, the report indicates that the rate of street 
prostitution in both Norway and Denmark was estimated at a figure three times that of Sweden‘s, 
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and that due to the economic and social similarities that exist among these three countries, ―it is 
reasonable to assume that the reduction in street prostitution in Sweden is a direct result of 
criminalization‖ (SOU, 2010, p. 7). A study presented at the 2008 Nordic Council of Ministers 
further estimated that approximately 300 women and 50 men were advertising the sale of sexual 
services online in Sweden (Holmstrom & Skilbrei, 2008).  The 2010 Swedish commission also 
addressed the role of the Internet in the overall prostitution arena: 
 ―In the last five years, Internet prostitution has increased in Sweden, Denmark and 
 Norway. However, the scale of this form of prostitution is more extensive in our 
 neighboring countries, and there is nothing to indicate that a greater increase in 
 prostitution over the Internet has occurred in Sweden than in these comparable countries. 
 This indicates that the ban has not led to a change in arenas, that is, from street 
 prostitution to the Internet, in Sweden. In light of this, it should be possible to conclude 
 that the reduction of street prostitution by half that took place in Sweden represents a real 
 reduction in prostitution here and that this reduction is also mainly a result of the 
 criminalization of sex purchases‖ (Skarhed, 2010, p. 8). 
 As reported by The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande 
rådet - Brå) (an agency under the Ministry of Justice), the number of those prosecuted for 
purchasing sexual services more than tripled from about 100 decisions in 2009 to almost 340 in 
2010, which fell to 238 in 2013 ( rottsf rebyggande r det, 2014). 
 In 2011, Susanne Dodillet and Petra Östergren presented a conference paper at The 
Hague critiquing the Swedish commission's evaluation, noting methodological flaws that they 
claim may misrepresent the relationship effect of the laws on the occurrence and scope of 
prostitution (Dodillet & Östergren, 2011). The paper compares the information and findings 
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presented by the Swedish commission to those of several other "authorities that have been 
responsible for reporting on prostitution and evaluating the policy," (Dodillet & Östergren, 2011, 
7).  According to their comparative analysis, Dodillet and Östergren assert that  
―one has to look at several factors to understand the discrepancy between the 
stated success of the Sex Purchase Act and its documented effects. While there are some 
police, social workers and former sex workers who claim that the ban has indeed helped 
reduce prostitution and trafficking and deterred clients without any adverse effects, the 
reports and documents that have a scientific rather than ideological base do not support 
these success claims. (p. 25) 
Theoretical Support for the Present Inquiry - Deterrence 
 As previously indicated (in Chapter One), when applied to criminal behavior, deterrence 
theory asserts that rational actors weigh the threat of punishment against the benefits of illegal 
activities when considering the commission of a crime. If the anticipated costs of committing 
crime outweigh its perceived benefits, rational actors will be deterred from engaging in criminal 
activity. Discussions of deterrence theory often distinguish between ‗‗general‘‘ and "specific" 
deterrence. General deterrence refers to the notion that a society's population will refrain from 
committing crime if punishment has been demonstrated to be the consequence; specific 
deterrence (sometimes called "special deterrence") refers to the deterrent effect of an individual's 
punishment on his or her future behavior (Braga and Weisburd, 2011; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2000; 
Nagin, 2012; Onwudiwe et al., 2005). General deterrence is contingent upon acceptance of 
rational choice theory, which assumes that all individuals respond to incentives; "Some people 
become ‗criminals‘ not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but 
because their benefits and costs differ" (Becker, 1968, p. 176). 
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 Historically, deterrence theory has asserted that deterrence from the commission criminal 
acts corresponds to the perceived level of certainty, severity, and swiftness of the subsequent 
punishment (Beccaria, 1767; Nagin, 2012; Onwudiwe et al., 2005).  The following literature 
review will introduce perspectives on the role of deterrence in modern law enforcement, with a 
focus on the discussion surrounding the roles of certainty, severity, and celerity in relation to 
criminal punishment.  Once introduced, the components of certainty, severity, and celerity will 
be utilized as the basis for the comparative analysis of the Swedish and UK demand reduction 
policies, in order to identify themes representative of deterrence theory.  
 To introduce an analysis of modern research surrounding the components of deterrence 
theory, it is appropriate to review Gary Becker's 1968 study of crime and deterrence, which is 
credited with prompting major altitudinal shifts in the study of crime (Mendes, 2004; Valpey, 
2010. His work is credited for the contemporary utilitarian approach to crime and punishment, by 
introducing a formal model of deterrence theory focused on the contemplation of  risk, 
prompting social scientists to further investigate the roles of severity and certainty in deterring 
crime (Mendes, 2004; Valpey, 2010). Becker (1968) argues that a rational public policy should 
assure that crime is not a beneficial course of action, and that the expected utility (benefit) of 
crime can be reduced by increasing the certainty or severity of punishment. Becker´s formulation 
of deterrence further asserts that the certainty and severity of punishment is conditional upon 
each potential criminal's attitude towards risk: risk-acceptant individuals are more likely to be 
deterred by higher probabilities of arrest and conviction than by the increased severity of 
punishment, while risk avoidant individuals are more likely to be deterred by increased severity 
of punishment than by the increased certainty of punishment (Becker, 1968; Mendes, 2004; 
Valpey, 2010). Finally, Becker asserts that an efficient model of punishment must consider its 
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associated social costs, and as such, maintains that fine-based punishments should be employed 
whenever it is acceptable to do so (Becker, 1968; Mendes, 2004; Valpey, 2010). 
 Certainty and Severity of Punishment 
  Cesare Beccaria asserted that the certainty of punishment is the most influential 
component of effective deterrence (Beccaria, 1767).  Modern evaluations consistently conclude 
that certainty of punishment effectively deters criminal behavior.  In his 1969 research, 
criminologist Charles Tittle found the certainty of imprisonment has a positive effect on the 
deterrence of all crimes, but the severity of punishment had a similar effect only with regard to 
homicide (Tittle, 1969). In 1974, a related study conducted by Tittle and Rowe identified a 
"tipping point" relationship between certainty and severity of punishment; crime clearance rates 
(representative of the certainty of punishment) have to reach 30 percent or higher in order for 
severity to have an influential effect on deterrence outcomes (Tittle & Rowe, 1974). William C. 
Bailey confirmed Tittle and Rowe's conclusions in his partial replication and extension of their 
study (Bailey, 1976).  Multiple additional studies have supported Tittle's findings that the 
certainty of punishment has a more influential deterrent effect than its severity, and that without 
certainty, the severity of punishment has little if any deterrent effect (Antunes & Hunt, 1974; 
Farrington et al., 1994; Horney & Marshall, 1992; Mendes, 2004; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2000; 
Nagin 2013; Parker and Grasmick, 1979; Paternoster, 1987; Paternoster & Iovanni, 1986). 
 A 1999 report by members of the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge University, 
commissioned by Home Office, presented a review of research of major deterrence studies to 
date. The report concluded that existing research did not ―provide a basis for inferring that 
increasing the severity of sentences generally is capable of enhancing deterrent effects‖ (Von 
Hirsch, Bottoms, Burney & Wilkstrom, 1999, p.1). The review further indicated that increased 
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certainty of apprehension and punishment corresponds with decreasing crime rates (Von Hirsch, 
et al., 1999) 
  Celerity of Punishment 
 The criminological foundation for inclusion of celerity as a component of deterrence 
theory is grounded in behavioral conditioning, specifically, the Pavlovian conditioning studies, in 
which experimenters effectively suppressed undesirable animal behaviors with negative 
reinforcements (punishments) that were administered within six seconds following the targeted 
behavior (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2000). Critics of this attribution assert that the Pavlovian case for 
celerity neglects to address that  humans possess greater cognitive potential for considering 
remote consequences, and since such conditioning results from prior punishment of the 
individual, such behavioral conditioning would not have a general deterrent effect (Howe & 
Brandau, 1988; Tittle, 1980; Gibbs, 1968).  
 In contrast to the considerable amount of attention that is devoted to the deterrent 
influence potential of certainty and severity of punishment, few studies investigate the role of 
punishment celerity (Apel & Nagin 2011; Cook 1980; Morgan, 2012; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2000; 
Nagin, 2012; Onwudiwe et al., 2005).  William Bailey (1980) conducted a cross-sectional 
examination of the deterrent effect of certainty and celerity with regard to the death penalty for 
the crime of homicide across 40 states, controlling for potential spuriousness in various socio-
demographic variables (Bailey, 1980). The study found that "analysis consistently fails to 
provide support for the deterrence argument for the certainty and celerity of executions," (Bailey, 
1980, p. 1).  
 Nagin & Pograsky 's (2000) study, which proposed to integrate the non-legal 
consequences from conviction  into the traditional deterrence framework, surveyed 252 college 
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students on their preference for celerity, regarding a hypothetical punishment (suspension of 
driving privileges) for the offense of drinking and driving. The results of the study indicated that 
celerity of punishment does not have a significant deterrent effect. 
 Additional Considerations of Deterrence Literature 
Classical deterrence theory would advise that punishment severity should correspond 
positively with effective deterrence outcomes, however, literature discussing the unintended 
impact of severe punishments on recidivism rates shows the opposite to be true. A meta-analysis 
conducted in 1999 reviewed fifty studies dating back to 1958, which addressed various offenses 
and criminal histories associated with 336,052 offenders. After controlling for criminal history 
and substance abuse histories, the authors found offenders receiving heavy prison sentences 
(those with an average length of 30 months) showed a 3 percent increase in recidivism when 
compared to those who received average sentences of 12.9 months. Further, the same study 
compared recidivism outcomes between those who received prison sentences, and those who 
received community-based sentences. The recidivism rate for those receiving the prison sentence 
was seven percent higher than those receiving the community-based sentence (Gendreau, Little, 
& Goggin, 1999). 
An additional consideration regarding the assessment of deterrence precepts that has been 
raised pertains to the perception of risk and punishment by potential offenders. In order for 
sanctions to effectively deter, one must be knowledgeable of the associated risks and 
consequences when considering commission of an infraction. Studies have shown that the 
general public may tend to underestimate the sanctions associated with various crimes, due to 
lack of awareness of sentencing policies and/or policy amendments (Williams, Gibbs, & 
Erickson, 1980; Von Hirsch et al., 1999). 
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In his 2009 work, ―When Brute Force Fails,‖ Mark Kleiman addresses the discussion 
surrounding punishment certainty as a more effective deterrent than punishment severity, 
asserting that the US Justice system‘s traditional reliance upon punishment severity is ineffective 
and unsustainable. He proposes that instead of allocating resources toward the administration of 
severe punishments, an alternative approach that stresses swift and certain punishment could 
effectively deter crime. Kleiman theorizes that since a small proportion of offenders account for 
the majority of crime in the US, that instead of spending resources on severe punishments which 
perpetuate cycles of recidivism, targeted interventions should be directed at the individuals most 
likely to offend, including persistent monitoring and concentrated enforcement efforts, in order 
to effectively deter crime (Kleiman, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
Research Design  
 As demand reduction relies upon effectively deterring people from purchasing sexual 
services, the demand reduction policies of Sweden and the UK will be analyzed in comparison 
with the components of deterrence theory. Specifically, the Swedish policy to be examined is 
Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish Penal Code (henceforth, ―Chapter 6, Section 11‖); the UK 
policy to be examined is Section 53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act (2003) (henceforth, ―Section 
53(a)‖. The forthcoming analysis seeks to determine the extent to which the text of each policy is 
associated with the following deterrence theory principles: certainty of punishment, severity of 
punishment, and swiftness of punishment. The research design for the present inquiry will be 
qualitative and non-experimental in nature, and will consist of an interpretative policy analysis.  
Research Question 
        The following research question will be answered: based on an analysis of the demand 
reduction policies of Sweden and the UK, which themes of deterrence are most prevalent in the 
policy texts, and how do the policies compare in this regard? Specifically, does either policy 
display stronger themes of severity, certainty, and/or celerity, in relation to the other? 
Target Population  
 As this inquiry was comprised of a policy evaluation, individual subjects were not 
involved. The data to be examined includes Chapter 6, and Section 53(a), as well as 
supplemental information regarding charging and sentencing practices, when available. 
Data Collection Procedures 
 Policy texts for both Chapter 6, Section 11 and Section 53(a) were downloaded from their 
respective governmental websites. Electronic files containing the policies (and related 
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information) as well as the analyzed rubrics have been saved to the researcher‘s personal cloud 
storage space.  
Sample 
 The content of each data set was organized by the researcher into a two-column rubric 
using Microsoft Word (policy information was divided into separate columns for each policy, 
respectively).  The policy language detailing the associated offenses as well as the language 
detailing the punishment associated with each policy was included in the rubric. As charging 
practices and sentencing guidelines were not available with regard to Sweden‘s policy, 
supplemental statistical information surrounding arrest outcomes was included in order to 
support the assessment of Chapter 6/11. 
Data Analysis 
 The researcher analyzed the content of each data set in order to identify characteristics 
indicative of punishment severity, punishment certainty, and punishment swiftness. Each data set 
includes the language of the involved policies and the proscribed criminal/civil penalties. As 
confirmed by electronic correspondence with a representative for the UK‘s Office of the 
Sentencing Council, the Sentencing Council has not published a sentencing guideline pertaining 
to Section 53(a), likely due to the fact that the maximum penalty is a fine subject to summary 
conviction. The researcher was unable to readily locate related supplemental information that 
would further supplement an analysis of deterrence principles with regard to this offence. For 
Sweden‘s policy, information regarding charging practices and sentencing guidelines was not 
available for this policy available. In absence of this data, in order to inform analysis of 
deterrence themes related to Sweden‘s policy, the researcher included readily available statistics 
46 
 
issued by Sweden‘s National Council on Crime Prevention, which detail sentencing outcomes 
for individuals charged with violations of Chapter 6, Section 11. 
 Utilizing a rubric listing the indicated data, characteristics suggestive of punishment 
severity were highlighted in blue, and those of punishment certainty were underlined. Although 
initially designated to be italicized, as further discussed in Chapter Four, characteristics of 
punishment swiftness were not detected in the data set. Once categorized, the identified deterrent 
attributes of each policy were compared in relation to each other.  
 Instructions for the independent coder were included on a cover sheet enclosed with the 
rubric (see Appendix A). The following definitions were provided to ensure consistent 
understanding of the relevant terms between the researcher and the independent coder: 
 Deterrence: deterrence theory claims that rational actors weigh the threat of punishment 
against the benefits of illegal activities when considering the commission of a crime. If 
the anticipated costs of committing crime outweigh its perceived benefits, rational actors 
will be deterred from engaging in criminal activity. Deterrence theory further suggests 
that deterrence from criminal acts may correspond to the perceived level of certainty, 
severity, and swiftness of the subsequent punishment (Becker, 1976; Morgan, 2012). 
 Certainty: the perceived likelihood that apprehension and punishment for commission of 
a crime will occur (Onwudiwe et al., 2005) 
 Severity: harshness of the punishment associated with a crime (Onwudiwe et al., 2005) 
 Swiftness: how quickly punishment for an associated crime is administered (Onwudiwe 
et al., 2005) 
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Reliability  
 To evaluate inter-rater reliability, the analysis was conducted by an additional 
independent reviewer, and the percentage of inter-rater agreement was calculated as the number 
of agreements in observations divided by the total number of observations (Hallgren, 2012). 
Further, to evaluate reliability over time, each coder repeated the analysis exercise fourteen days 
after completing their initial analysis. The percentage of reliability across time for each coder 
was calculated as the number of agreements in observations in first and second rounds of 
analyses, divided by the total number of observations (Hallgren, 2012). Reliability over time is 
an independent calculation for each coder (their results were not averaged together). 
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Chapter Four: Results 
 
The researcher conducted the first rubric analysis on February 7, 2015, and repeated the 
exercise on February 21, 2015 to assess coder reliability over time. An independent coder did the 
same, conducting the first analysis on February 8, 2015, and the second on February 23, 2015.  
For each specific policy analysis, inter-rater reliability was measured by calculating the total the 
number of agreements in observations and dividing that number divided by the total number of 
recorded observations. The initial round of analyses of Section 53(a) yielded an inter-rater 
reliability score of  83 percent, and for the second round, a score of 83 percent, for an average 
inter-rater reliability score of 83 percent. The initial round of analyses of Chapter 6, Section 11 
yielded an inter-rater reliability score of 83 percent, and for the second round, a score of 91 
percent, for an overall average inter-rater reliability score of 87 percent.  
The percentage of reliability across time for each coder was calculated as the number of 
agreements in observations in first and second rounds of analyses, divided by the total number of 
observations (Hallgren, 2012). Reliability across time is an independent calculation for each 
coder (their results were not averaged together). Reliability across time for the analyses of 
Section 53(a) yielded a reliability score of 100 percent for each coder; analyses of Chapter 6, 
Section 11, yielded an across-time reliability score of 100 percent for the researcher, and 92 
percent for the independent coder.  
Table 1 details observation totals across time for each policy and deterrence attribute. 
Section 53(a) yielded a total of 22 observations, of which, 20 were coded as indicative of 
punishment certainty, and 2 were coded as indicative of punishment severity. Chapter 6, Section 
11 yielded a total of 23 observations, of which, 12 were coded as indicative of punishment 
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certainty, and 11 were coded as indicative of punishment severity. Tables 2 and 3 detail the 
same, but for each individual coder only.  
 Across both policies, the observations recorded in Table 3 include a higher rate of 
severity indications than those recorded in Table 2. Results indicating punishment swiftness were 
not observed in either set of analyses. 
 
 
 
Table #1. 
 
Observation totals across time for each policy and deterrence 
attribute 
 
Deterrence 
Attribute 
Section 
53(a) 
Chapter 6, 
Section 11 
Total  
(By Attribute) 
 
 
Certainty 
 
 
22 
 
12 
 
34 
Severity 
 
2 11 13 
Swiftness 
 
0 0 0 
Total (By 
Policy) 
 
24 23 47 
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Table #2. 
 
Observation totals across time for each policy and deterrence 
attribute (Researcher’s Results) 
 
Deterrence 
Attribute 
Section 
53(a) 
Chapter 6, 
Section 11 
Total  
(By Attribute) 
 
 
Certainty 
 
 
12 
 
6 
 
18 
Severity 
 
0 4 4 
Swiftness 
 
0 0 0 
Total (By 
Policy) 
 
12 10 22 
 
 
 
 
Table #3. 
 
Observation totals across time for each policy and deterrence 
attribute (Independent Coder’s Results) 
 
Deterrence 
Attribute 
Section 
53(a) 
Chapter 6, 
Section 11 
Total  
(By Attribute) 
 
 
Certainty 
 
 
10 
 
6 
 
16 
Severity 
 
2 7 9 
Swiftness 
 
0 0 0 
Total (By 
Policy) 
 
12 13 25 
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Chapter Five: Discussion and Recommendations 
 
Through identification of themes representative of punishment certainty, punishment 
severity, and punishment swiftness in the examined policies, this assessment offers a small 
contribution toward a more comprehensive understanding of how to most effectively reduce the 
demand for sexual services through deterrence. 
The present analysis of the UK‘s Section 53(a) indicated a significantly higher presence 
of themes associated with punishment certainty, in comparison to those observed for punishment 
severity. While Sweden‘s policy was drafted with the understanding that any form of prostitution 
is a form of violence against women, although various UK politicians have issued publications 
asserting the similar sentiments, the letter of the UK policy only specifies prostitution ‗by force‘ 
as an offense (All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution and the Global Sex Trade, 2014; 
Dodillet, S. & Östergren, P., 2011; Eckberg, 2013; Home Office, 2008; Sexual Offences Act, 
Section 53, 2003; Waltman, 2011). Despite this more narrow focus on what may be considered a 
less common (yet more egregious) offense, the UK policy analysis observed themes indicative of 
punishment certainty at a rate of 9:1, compared to those indicative of punishment severity. The 
elements of strict liability and summary conviction in the UK policy served as significant 
catalysts for punishment certainty in the recorded observations. However, absent the possibility 
of a prison sentence for the UK policy, which was consistently considered indicative of 
punishment severity in the Swedish policy analysis, this ratio is not surprising.  
Analysis of Chapter 6, Section 11 indicated a more balanced measure of themes 
associated with punishment certainty and punishment severity, with a rate of approximately 1:1, 
with certainty recorded at a slightly higher rate. Multiple mentions of punishment up to one year 
in prison accounted for the majority of severity observations. Provisions indicating that the same 
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charges apply for merely attempting to purchase sexual services and a high conviction rate for 
those charged with the crime accounted for themes of punishment certainty.  
Themes associated with punishment swiftness were not observed for either policy. It is 
the opinion of the researcher that comparative analysis of policy enforcement timelines and 
outcomes would serve as a better indicator for themes of punishment swiftness.  
Limitations 
In order to accurately interpret the significance of these findings, it necessary to discuss 
the limitations of the research design. Observations were made through analysis of policy texts 
only, without a measure to account for the disparity in scope between the two policies. As 
Sweden‘s policy regards any purchase of sexual services to be an offense, as opposed to the UK 
policy (which only pertains to the purchase of sexual services from persons subject to force), the 
scope of risk for breaking the law is arguably much broader in Sweden than in the UK (Ministry 
of Justice, 2005; Sexual Offences Act, 2003).  
This analysis is based upon the subjective interpretations of the researcher, which may 
not reflect the overall sentiment of the populations of Sweden and the UK. Further, the coding 
framework does not account for themes that may be perceived as counterintuitive deterrence 
strategies. For example, with regard to the UK policy, charging practices recommended by the 
Crown Prosecution Service (2014) state:  
 "If the police apprehend someone who has paid for sexual services with a person 
 involved in street prostitution, it is likely that soliciting (section 51(A) Sexual Offences 
 Act 2003) would be a more appropriate offence to pursue, as this does not require proof 
of exploitative conduct." (p.13). 
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Although the present analysis consistently identified this as an indicator of certainty, from the 
perspective that if the burden of proof is too difficult for a Section 53(a) conviction, it offers law 
enforcement the opportunity to apprehend offenders for a different summary offense which 
carries the same penalty, this recommendation poses potentially significant implications that are 
not captured in the present research design. Since the recommended charging practice explicitly 
demonstrates the potential difficulty of proving the presence of exploitative conduct, offenders 
may consider kerb crawling to be more risky than patronizing a brothel or private venue, since 
street prostitution is likely to be more visible to law enforcement, and both offenses carry the 
same summary conviction and associated penalty. Such an interpretation may diminish the 
perception of punishment certainty for a Section 53(a) offense, relative to that of a Section 51(a) 
offense, thus making private venues a more attractive option for the purchase of sexual services. 
This is problematic since, as indicated in the charging practice, private venues/brothels are more 
likely to be associated with prostitution subject to force/exploitation. Such an outcome would 
potentially impact any associated reduction in demand, and instead, could increase demand for 
less visible venues for prostitution.  
Discussion 
 As previously introduced in the literature review, criminal deterrence research has 
considered the value of more certain and swift, but less severe punishment approaches, as tough 
sentencing poses an unsustainable drain on resources, and is often argued to pose more problems 
than solutions, with regard to reducing crime (Gendreau, Goggin, & Cullen, 1999; Kleiman, 
2009; Williams, Gibbs, & Erickson, 1980; Von Hirsch et al., 1999). When applied to the findings 
of this inquiry, the UK policy‘s prominent display of themes associated with punishment 
certainty, with a modest showing for severity, would serve as an exemplar deterrence approach. 
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Sweden‘s policy casts a broader definition of what constitutes an offense, thus intrinsically 
making punishment seem more certain (since the risk of committing an offense is higher). 
Themes indicative of punishment certainty were significant, while also exhibiting significant 
themes of punishment severity, due to possibility of imprisonment, while not imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences. Therefore, while Sweden‘s policy indicated themes of both 
certainty and severity, with flexibility for moderate sentencing options, it too abides by the 
recommendations made in the literature. Of course, the analysis of literature surrounding sex 
trafficking and prostitution in these countries indicates the complexity of sex trafficking and 
prostitution in Sweden and the UK, and the narrow scope of this interpretation does not address 
these factors. 
 The importance of understanding which elements of deterrence most effectively reduce 
crime is evidenced by the extensive literature that exists surrounding the topic. As justice 
systems have limited resources with which to address the persistent and pervasive crime that 
exists throughout many modern societies, understanding the most efficient and effective manner 
in which to deter crime is a valuable pursuit. It is the opinion of the researcher that in order to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of how to effectively deter crime, general discussions 
regarding the components of deterrence theory must be supplemented with an analysis of 
policies and enforcement outcomes, specific to the nature of the crime being examined and the 
associated offending populations.  
Recommendations  
In order to gain a thorough understanding of how to effectively diminish the demand for 
sexual services by deterring the purchase of sexual services, the researcher poses the following 
recommendations for future research:  
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1) in order to gain a thorough understanding of policy effects, enforcement outcomes 
such as arrest and conviction rates, and associated sentences must be analyzed and 
compared to rates of demand for sexual services, measured by estimating the amount 
of sex workers/trafficking victims within the jurisdiction 
2) must also gauge how potential offenders subsequently perceive their level of risk in 
relation to these outcomes, and how their actions are influenced by these perceptions, 
which may be accomplished throughout qualitative polling and analysis of recidivism 
rates for crimes associated with purchasing sex 
3) In order to determine which punishments most effectively deter (e.g. fines vs publicly 
posting names and photos of persons arrested for purchasing sex), future research 
must also account for characteristics of offender populations. With regard to 
purchasing sex, this is particularly important, as many of the spurious variables which 
drive people toward opportunistic crimes (theft or fraud due to economic strain) may 
be less likely to play a role in someone‘s decision to purchase sexual services. 
Conclusion 
As the literature indicates, the cost of administering punishment in modern society is 
substantial, and significant attention has been devoted to understanding the most effective 
deterrence strategies in order to mitigate crime and reduce the costs of punishment. In addition to 
preserving resources, preventing crime also prevents victimization. Thus, it is important to 
pursue a comprehensive understanding of the most effective approach to deterring crime. With 
regard to ending demand for sex trafficking, it is imperative that ineffective policy approaches be 
addressed and minimized, while continually pursuing the most effective prevention strategies. 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
 
The enclosed pages include two identical tables containing policy information related to Section 
53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as amended by the 2009 Policing and Crime Act) and 
Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish Penal Code: Purchase of a Sexual Service. The purpose of 
this exercise is to identify themes representative of criminal deterrence concepts (see definition 
below). Namely, the three concepts that this exercise seeks to identify are punishment certainty, 
punishment severity, and punishment swiftness/celerity (see definitions below). 
 
 Criminal deterrence: deterrence theory claims that rational actors weigh the threat of 
punishment against the benefits of illegal activities when considering the commission of a 
crime. If the anticipated costs of committing crime outweigh its perceived benefits, 
rational actors will be deterred from engaging in criminal activity. Deterrence theory 
further suggests that deterrence from criminal acts may correspond to the perceived level 
of certainty, severity, and swiftness of the subsequent punishment (Becker, 1976; 
Morgan, 2012). 
 Certainty: the perceived likelihood that apprehension and punishment for commission of 
a crime will occur (Onwudiwe et al., 2005) 
 Severity: harshness of the punishment associated with a crime (Onwudiwe et al., 2005) 
 Swiftness/celerity: how quickly punishment for an associated crime is administered 
(Onwudiwe et al., 2005) 
You will find that the tables on the following pages are comprised of three columns. The 
leftmost column describes the nature of the information that is listed in the associated row.  
The second column contains information pertaining to Section 53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 
(2003), and the third contains information pertaining to Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish 
Penal Code: Purchase of a Sexual Service. 
Based upon the information found in the definitions above, if you encounter information that you 
perceive to be reflective of punishment certainty, underline the specified text; for information 
that you perceive to be reflective of punishment severity, highlighted the specified text in neon 
blue; for information that you perceive to be reflective of swiftness/celerity, italicize the 
associated text. For example, if you believe that components of the following statement indicate 
punishment certainty, severity, and swiftness/celerity, you would code it as follows: 
―The alien explained that on his planet, if you are caught eating potatoes, you receive forty lashes 
at the time of apprehension, without any sort of due process/trial proceedings.‖ 
If a statement reflects more than of these characteristics, simply layer the coding as follows‖  
In his state, if you are caught driving under the influence of alcohol, your license is automatically 
taken away immediately.  
Thank you for your participation in this exercise. Please contact me with any questions that you 
may have. 
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Appendix B: Completed Coding Rubrics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KS - 2/7 
Section 53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(as amended by the 2009 Policing and Crime Act) 
Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish Penal Code:  
Purchase of a Sexual Service 
 
 
 
Policy Text 
Paying for sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force 
etc. 
A person (A) commits an offence if: 
 A makes or promises payment for the sexual 
services of a prostitute (B), 
 a third person (C) has engaged in exploitative 
conduct of a kind likely to induce or encourage B 
to provide the sexual services for which A has 
made or promised payment, and 
 C engaged in that conduct for or in the 
expectation of gain for C or another person (apart 
from A or B). 
The following are irrelevant— 
 where in the world the sexual services are to be 
provided and whether those services are provided, 
 whether A is, or ought to be, aware that C has 
engaged in exploitative conduct 
 C engages in exploitative conduct if: 
a) C uses force, threats (whether or not 
relating to violence) or any other form of 
coercion, or 
b) C practises any form of deception 
 
(A) shall be sentenced for purchase of sexual services 
to fines or imprisonment for a maximum of one year if 
(A) obtains casual sexual liaison for payment if the act 
is not punishable according to a provision in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. 
 
The provision in para. 1 is applicable even when 
the payment is promised [and services have not 
yet been rendered] or given [brokered] by a 
third party. 
 
*Sec. 15: Punishment for attempt to purchase of 
a sexual service shall be at most what is 
applicable to the same completed crime 
 
Penalty 
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the 
standard scale 
A person found guilty of this offense is subject to fines 
or imprisonment for a maximum of one year 
Charging 
Practice 
If the police apprehend someone who has paid for sexual 
services with a person involved in street prostitution, it is 
likely that soliciting (section 51(A) Sexual Offences Act 
2003) would be a more appropriate offence to pursue as this 
does not require proof of exploitative conduct. 
 
The offence is most likely to arise in police brothel raids 
where there is enforcement against suspects controlling or 
exploiting prostitution for gain and where clients are 
apprehended in the operation. However, the offence is not 
limited to particular types of premises. It could therefore 
apply to premises which may have a legitimate business, for 
example a nightclub, as well as online internet-based 
services. 
Information not available. 
Sentencing 
Guidelines 
As confirmed by electronic correspondence with a 
representative for the Office of the Sentencing Council, the 
Sentencing Council has not published a guideline for this 
offence 
Information not available. 
Supplemental 
Information 
N/A 
In 2013, of 239 persons charged with purchasing 
sexual services, 1 received a prison sentence, and 234 
were issued fines (National Council on Crime 
Prevention, 2014). 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KS - 2/21 
Section 53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(as amended by the 2009 Policing and Crime Act) 
Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish Penal Code:  
Purchase of a Sexual Service 
 
 
 
Policy Text 
Paying for sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force 
etc. 
A person (A) commits an offence if: 
 A makes or promises payment for the sexual 
services of a prostitute (B), 
 a third person (C) has engaged in exploitative 
conduct of a kind likely to induce or encourage B 
to provide the sexual services for which A has 
made or promised payment, and 
 C engaged in that conduct for or in the 
expectation of gain for C or another person (apart 
from A or B). 
The following are irrelevant— 
 where in the world the sexual services are to be 
provided and whether those services are 
provided, 
 whether A is, or ought to be, aware that C has 
engaged in exploitative conduct 
 C engages in exploitative conduct if: 
c) C uses force, threats (whether or not 
relating to violence) or any other form of 
coercion, or 
d) C practises any form of deception 
 
(A) shall be sentenced for purchase of sexual services 
to fines or imprisonment for a maximum of one year if 
(A) obtains casual sexual liaison for payment if the act 
is not punishable according to a provision in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. 
 
The provision in para. 1 is applicable even when 
the payment is promised [and services have not 
yet been rendered] or given [brokered] by a third 
party. 
 
*Sec. 15: Punishment for attempt to purchase of 
a sexual service shall be at most what is 
applicable to the same completed crime 
 
Penalty 
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the 
standard scale 
A person found guilty of this offense is subject to fines 
or imprisonment for a maximum of one year 
Charging 
Practice 
If the police apprehend someone who has paid for sexual 
services with a person involved in street prostitution, it is 
likely that soliciting (section 51(A) Sexual Offences Act 
2003) would be a more appropriate offence to pursue as this 
does not require proof of exploitative conduct. 
 
The offence is most likely to arise in police brothel raids 
where there is enforcement against suspects controlling or 
exploiting prostitution for gain and where clients are 
apprehended in the operation. However, the offence is not 
limited to particular types of premises. It could therefore 
apply to premises which may have a legitimate business, for 
example a nightclub, as well as online internet-based 
services. 
Information not available.  
Sentencing 
Guidelines 
As confirmed by electronic correspondence with a 
representative for the Office of the Sentencing Council, the 
Sentencing Council has not published a guideline for this 
offence 
Information not available. 
Supplemental 
Information 
N/A 
In 2013, of 239 persons charged with purchasing sexual 
services, 1 received a prison sentence, and 234 were 
issued fines (National Council on Crime Prevention, 
2014). 
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IC 2/8 
Section 53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(as amended by the 2009 Policing and Crime Act) 
Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish Penal Code: 
 Purchase of a Sexual Service 
 
 
 
Policy Text 
Paying for sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force 
etc. 
A person (A) commits an offence if: 
 A makes or promises payment for the sexual 
services of a prostitute (B), 
 a third person (C) has engaged in exploitative 
conduct of a kind likely to induce or encourage B 
to provide the sexual services for which A has 
made or promised payment, and 
 C engaged in that conduct for or in the expectation 
of gain for C or another person (apart from A or 
B). 
The following are irrelevant— 
 where in the world the sexual services are to be 
provided and whether those services are provided, 
 whether A is, or ought to be, aware that C has 
engaged in exploitative conduct 
 C engages in exploitative conduct if: 
e) C uses force, threats (whether or not 
relating to violence) or any other form of 
coercion, or 
f) C practises any form of deception 
 
(A) shall be sentenced for purchase of sexual services 
to fines or imprisonment for a maximum of one year 
if (A) obtains casual sexual liaison for payment if the 
act is not punishable according to a provision in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. 
 
The provision in para. 1 is applicable even 
when the payment is promised [and services 
have not yet been rendered] or given 
[brokered] by a third party. 
 
*Sec. 15: Punishment for attempt to purchase 
of a sexual service shall be at most what is 
applicable to the same completed crime 
 
Penalty 
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the 
standard scale 
A person found guilty of this offense is subject to 
fines or imprisonment for a maximum of one year 
Charging 
Practice 
If the police apprehend someone who has paid for sexual 
services with a person involved in street prostitution, it is 
likely that soliciting (section 51(A) Sexual Offences Act 
2003) would be a more appropriate offence to pursue as this 
does not require proof of exploitative conduct. 
 
The offence is most likely to arise in police brothel raids 
where there is enforcement against suspects controlling or 
exploiting prostitution for gain and where clients are 
apprehended in the operation. However, the offence is not 
limited to particular types of premises. It could therefore 
apply to premises which may have a legitimate business, for 
example a nightclub, as well as online internet-based 
services. 
Information not available.  
Sentencing 
Guidelines 
As confirmed by electronic correspondence with a 
representative for the Office of the Sentencing Council, the 
Sentencing Council has not published a guideline for this 
offence 
Information not available. 
Supplemental 
Information 
N/A 
In 2013, of 239 persons charged with purchasing 
sexual services, 1 received a prison sentence, and 234 
were issued fines (National Council on Crime 
Prevention, 2014). 
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IC 2/23 
Section 53(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(as amended by the 2009 Policing and Crime Act) 
Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Swedish Penal Code:  
Purchase of a Sexual Service 
 
 
 
Policy Text 
Paying for sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force 
etc. 
A person (A) commits an offence if: 
 A makes or promises payment for the sexual 
services of a prostitute (B), 
 a third person (C) has engaged in exploitative 
conduct of a kind likely to induce or encourage B 
to provide the sexual services for which A has 
made or promised payment, and 
 C engaged in that conduct for or in the expectation 
of gain for C or another person (apart from A or 
B). 
The following are irrelevant— 
 where in the world the sexual services are to be 
provided and whether those services are provided, 
 whether A is, or ought to be, aware that C has 
engaged in exploitative conduct 
 C engages in exploitative conduct if: 
g) C uses force, threats (whether or not 
relating to violence) or any other form of 
coercion, or 
h) C practises any form of deception 
 
(A) shall be sentenced for purchase of sexual services to 
fines or imprisonment for a maximum of one year if (A) 
obtains casual sexual liaison for payment if the act is 
not punishable according to a provision in the preceding 
sections of this chapter. 
 
The provision in para. 1 is applicable even when 
the payment is promised [and services have not 
yet been rendered] or given [brokered] by a third 
party. 
 
*Sec. 15: Punishment for attempt to purchase of 
a sexual service shall be at most what is 
applicable to the same completed crime 
 
Penalty 
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the 
standard scale 
A person found guilty of this offense is subject to fines 
or imprisonment for a maximum of one year 
Charging 
Practice 
If the police apprehend someone who has paid for sexual 
services with a person involved in street prostitution, it is 
likely that soliciting (section 51(A) Sexual Offences Act 
2003) would be a more appropriate offence to pursue as this 
does not require proof of exploitative conduct. 
 
The offence is most likely to arise in police brothel raids 
where there is enforcement against suspects controlling or 
exploiting prostitution for gain and where clients are 
apprehended in the operation. However, the offence is not 
limited to particular types of premises. It could therefore 
apply to premises which may have a legitimate business, for 
example a nightclub, as well as online internet-based services. 
Information not available.  
Sentencing 
Guidelines 
As confirmed by electronic correspondence with a 
representative for the Office of the Sentencing Council, the 
Sentencing Council has not published a guideline for this 
offence 
Information not available. 
Supplemental 
Information 
N/A 
In 2013, of 239 persons charged with purchasing sexual 
services, 1 received a prison sentence, and 234 were 
issued fines (National Council on Crime Prevention, 
2014). 
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